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CAUT Bulletin Archives
1996-2016

June 2003

Exploring the Limits of Academic Freedom

Patrick O'Neill

Pursuing Academic Freedom: "Free and Fearless"?

Len M. Findlay & Paul M. Bidwell, eds. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Purich Publishing Ltd., 2001; 245 pp; paper $28.50 CA.
People seem to agree that Academic Freedom is a Good Thing, leaving the impression they also agree on what it means, who should be entitled to it and in what context, and whether or not it has limits or what they should be. In fact, however, its meaning, limits and relationship to concepts such as tenure and intellectual property are all open to debate. And not everyone even agrees that it is a Good Thing.

Stanley Fish, for instance, says "Academic freedom is a bad idea, a dubious principle that confuses eccentricity with genius and elevates pettiness, boorishness, and irresponsibility to the status of virtue. (It) evacuates morality by making all assertions equivalent and, because equivalent, inconsequential."

He then further complicates matters by saying that while he scorns academic freedom as a concept he supports it in practice and would do anything in his power to protect it. There must be aspects of this Good Thing that would repay serious exploration.

Such exploration took place at the University of Saskatchewan in 1996 in a conference entitled "Academic Freedom: The History and Future of a Defining Idea." The essays in Pursuing Academic Freedom are based on presentations at that conference.

The book covers a wide range of ideas about academic freedom including its link with tenure (Len Findlay, Victor Dwyer), its status in light of unionization (Peter MacKinnon), whether students have a right to academic freedom and what form it should take (Susan Vincent, Jackie Heslop), censorship in the academic library (Linda Fritz), academic freedom in public schools (Paul Clarke, Lyle Vinish), and academic freedom as a Eurocentric concept (Marie Battiste, Shelley Wright).

I propose to focus on some key themes and to offer a flavour of the arguments about those issues by chapter authors or by other academics cited in the book. These issues include the threats to academic freedom, whether there are any legitimate limits to its exercise, and the compatibility of academic freedom and the inclusive university.

What Threatens Academic Freedom?

Michiel Horne, who has written the definitive Canadian account of this topic (Academic Freedom in Canada: A History), was the keynote speaker at the conference. In his chapter "Academic Freedom in Canada, Past, Present, and Future," Horne says the threats to freedom of expression, teaching, and inquiry have shifted over time. In the first half of the 20th century ideas were censored because they challenged the powerful. Horne refers to the Crowe case which was foundational in CAUT's role as defender of freedom of expression in the academy.

This early threat from the right is fiercely documented in Jerry Zaslove's chapter, "The Lost Utopia of Academic Freedom." Zaslove was a founding faculty member at Simon Fraser University, and a witness to "The history of blacklisting, firings, smearing, bullying, lying, gossiping, red-baiting, fear-mongering, stereotyping and scapegoating ..."

But later, the source of threat shifted from right to left. Horne refers to political correctness that seemed to demand that ideas and their expression be toned down for fear of offending newcomers to the academy. In the Jeanne Cannizzo case at Scarborough, for example, a professor was hounded from the classroom because some of her students (and their supporters) disliked the content of a show she had earlier curated at the Royal Ontario Museum.

Horne's censure of political correctness is unequivocal: "It has traditionally been deemed essential to academic freedom that teachers determine the content of their courses. Suggestions that these be changed to match changes in the composition of the student body, for example, offend against this principle ... To require change on demographic or political grounds ... threatens academic freedom at the core." (pp. 30-31)

Moving to the current state of affairs and predicting the near future, Horne suggests the main threat to academic freedom is increasingly the demand that universities become more businesslike. Scholarship must serve a financial agenda. Much current research "is seen ... as frivolous self-indulgence that the economy cannot, and the university should not, sustain in an era where public financial support is declining." (p. 32)

The problem is not restricted to the intrusion of corporations as research sponsor. Horne notes the benefit of faculty research to student teaching is not clear, and some argue such research, since it competes for time, is actually conducted at the expense of teaching.

The problem of commercialization is also considered by several other authors in this book. Howard Woodhouse, in "Are Closer Ties with Business Undermining Academic Freedom?" argues that "if knowledge is reduced to an instrument for accumulating private wealth, its ability to be shared among a community of scholars simply will not survive." (p. 144)

Having established that academic freedom is not safe in the academy, we might now ask how safe it should be. Perhaps, in its traditional form, it is not only threatened but is also a source of threat. Various chapter authors take up aspects of this question in debating the limits of academic freedom, and in particular its relationship to the emerging ideal of inclusivity.

Can We Say Anything?

Does academic freedom mean professors in the academy are free to say anything? Yes, says Marvin Brown, a member of the psychology department at the University of Saskatchewan. In a chapter entitled "Academic Freedom - The Troubling Present and Questionable Future," Brown says: "In the university, there is no thought that cannot be entertained, and no topic or question that cannot or should not be investigated ... No topic is 'inappropriate!' Indeed, it is inevitable (in fact, desirable) that some of our views and subjects of inquiry will be offensive to someone." (p. 45)

A historian is allowed to question whether the holocaust occurred, a biologist can advance the creationist position, a psychologist can investigate psychic phenomena. The fact that some opinions are considered too outlandish for the academy leads Brown to conclude that "academic freedom is barely alive, and certainly not well in the academy today." (p. 46)

Some faculty members are much more qualified in their support for academic freedom as traditionally conceived. Janice Drakich, Marilyn Taylor, and Jennifer Bankier, quoted by Horne, put the case this way: "Should all 'verbal behaviour,' such as words in a classroom, be automatically protected by the concept of academic freedom? We would argue that the answer is no. Words cease to be an expression of academic freedom when they have an effect that interferes with the academic freedom of other people ... Adoption of a style of presentation that abuses or marginalizes others is a behavioural choice, and not a matter of intellectual right."

Susan Vincent, in her chapter "At the Margins of Academic Freedom," suggests the concept currently protects those least in need of protection and is unavailable to those who need protection the most. She identifies various marginalized groups which seem not to benefit from the academic freedom, and may even suffer because of it.

She points out that it is difficult for faculty on limited-term contracts to make much use of their freedom of expression. While academic freedom is often thought to protect controversial research, it fails to protect victims of harassment in the work place.

In fact, she argues, both academic freedom and the tenure to which it is usually linked may protect the harassers rather than the harassed. If tenure supports academic freedom, it also protects the privileges of those who create chilly climates for women, marginal groups, and other non-traditional newcomers to the academy.

Is Academic Freedom Exclusive or Inclusive?

A debate that runs through many chapters in this book is the question of whether academic freedom is friend or foe to an inclusive university. If these ideals conflict, which should take precedence? Or should the notion of academic freedom be broadened so that it takes into account the need for inclusiveness?

Jackie Heslop takes up this matter in her chapter "Towards Positive (Academic) Freedom." She rebuts the idea that an inclusive academy simply waters down controversy so that various groups are not offended. She argues that the new groups and new ideas in the academy represent new ways of knowing.

"It seems to me deeply ironic that while one of the uncontested purposes of academic freedom is to foster the development of new knowledges, those knowledges that would challenge academic freedom from the inside are so vehemently resisted by its custodians." (p. 204)

Heslop takes on Horne on a number of counts. He faulted CAUT for suggesting academic freedom should be exercised responsibly. But Heslop endorses the notion of responsibility, and advocates a "positive" academic freedom that should be seen less as a bastion of authority and autonomy and more as a network of obligations. Many of these obligations relate to the rights of students in the academy - the right to have knowledge made relevant to their lives, to represent their own interests at all administrative levels, and the right to be allowed to think critically.

She also takes on Brown, who regretted that in the current climate professors are forced to choose their words very carefully. Heslop asks, "As academics, shouldn't we choose our words carefully? ... We need to choose our words carefully not only for the sake of those who take offence to sexism, racism, homophobia, and so on, but for the sake of those who do not take offence."

I have highlighted a few of the many themes in this volume; there is a host of others. This is a stimulating book, and must reflect the intellectual excitement of the conference on which it was based. Among its contributions is the fact that its perspectives grow out of the Canadian context, and are relevant to education in this country.

Its various debates contrast with the complacency of Dalhousie President Carleton Stanley who is quoted by Horne as saying, in 1937, "Academic freedom is not, to the best of my knowledge, a burning issue in Canadian universities."

Pat O'Neill is president of the Canadian Psychological Association, former chair of CAUT's Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee, and a retired professor of psychology at Acadia University.

Work consulted: Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom: When sauce for the goose isn't sauce for the gander. The Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 26, 1999, pp. B4-B6.